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BRINGING THE LAW TO LIFE: A PLEA FOR
DISENCHANTMENT,
Frank Michelman
In his 1985 Stevens Lecture, Professor Owen Fiss spoke out in
protest against the Critical Legal Studies movement for promoting
the idea that "law is politics." 2 Fiss lodged two related objections
against any identification of law with politics. 3 First, he found that
this equation denies to law its claim to a special role in the commu-
nity's public life, that of expressing and effectuating the commu-
nity's considered and enduring "public values" as opposed to the
transient preferences of persons occupying seats of influence or
power.4 Second, Fiss found that equating law with politics denies to
judicial determinations of legal meaning their claim to objectivity
attained through participations in a special professional culture that
is emphatically not just a continuation of ordinary politics by other
means.5 To deny the professional autonomy-the discontinuity
from politics at large-of judicial determinations of legal meaning,
Fiss contended, is to make incomprehensible the claim for objectiv-
ity in those determinations, is to deny that law expresses value not
preference, is to encompass the death of the law.
I want to affirm here the view that law is best understood as a
form of politics. Only as thus understood, I believe, can law possi-
bly claim to approach the expression of public values in any sense of
that term consonant with the constitutionalist ideal of a government
that is "of the people by the people" and, at the same time, a gov-
ernment "of laws and not of men [sic]." '6 Politics, I contend, is the
only avenue by which public values (insofar as we can speak at all of
such matters) might possibly be determinable and accessible.
Accordingly, I take issue with two aspects of Fiss's argument. I
question that argument's resort to professional culture for the re-
demption of legal access to public values, but more fundamentally I
I This article is a revised version of my Stevens Lectures delivered in March 1988.
2 Fiss, The Death of the Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2, 9-10 (1986).
3 My reading of the argument of Fiss's Stevens Lecture draws on his other, related
writings, including Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 177 (1985) [hereinafter Fiss,
Conventionalism]; Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter Fiss, Objectivity]; and Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, Foreword].
4 See Fiss, supra note 2, at 8-10, 14.
5 See id at 9, 11.
6 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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question its overly narrow conception of what politics might possi-
bly be.
I cannot confidently say just how far my argument ought to be
taken as speaking on behalf of Critical Legal Studies. I believe that
many CLS adherents would agree with much of it. But I can also
imagine that many of them-and many others, too-will find at least
some of it to be impossibly unworldly, not so much a plea for dis-
enchantment as an exchange of one spell for another.
Let us begin, then, with a distinction between two conceptions
of the activity that we call "politics" and associate with both popular
elections and the doings of representative assemblies. The first con-
ception is one that current usage7 often calls "pluralist," but that I
will here call "instrumentalist." Typical of an instrumentalist con-
ception is Professor Fiss's observation that "[l]egislatures . . . are
not ideologically committed or institutionally suited to search for
the meaning of constitutional values, but instead see their primary
function in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of
the people-what they want and what they believe should be
done."8
In contrast stands what we may call a dialogic conception of
politics, which is distinguished from an instrumentalist conception
by two noteworthy features. First, a dialogic conception envisions-
or perhaps one ought to say it idealizes-politics as a normative ac-
tivity.9 It imagines politics as contestation over questions of value
and not simply questions of preference. 10 It envisions politics as a
process of reason not just of will, of persuasion not just of power,
directed toward agreement regarding a good or just, or at any rate
acceptable, way to order those aspects of life that involve people's
social relations and social natures.I 1
The second point about the dialogic conception of politics is
7 See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1542-43
(1988).
8 Fiss, Foreword, supra note 3, at 10. It is not clear how, if at all, Fiss would differen-
date "beliefs" about what "should" be done from "preferences" and "wants." The con-
text seems to require that "belief," here, be an ultimately private, individualistic
phenomenon in no way essentially dependent upon any intersubjective process or com-
municative action. Cf Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1512-13, 1526-27
(1988).
9 My argument does not require belief that all the activity that we would descrip-
tively identify as political does actually conform, or even that it ought always ideally to
conform, to a dialogic model. It does require belief that Americans are capable of such a
mode of politics, aspire to it, and sometimes achieve it. See Michelman, Conceptions of
Democracy: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1989) [here-
inafter Michelman, Conceptions]; Michelman, supra note 8, at 1508-15.
10 See, e.g., Fraser, Talking about Needs: Interpretive Contests as Political Conflicts in JeIl-
fare-State Societies, 99 ETHiCS 291, 292-96, 311-13 (1989).
11 See Michelman, Conceptions, supra note 9.
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that it is pragmatic. By this I mean that it envisions political argu-
ment as a kind of ethical argument that is culturally and historically
situated and conditioned but that also proceeds without founda-
tions.12 Pragmatic political argument is animated and constrained
by a consciousness of its situation within, and answerability to, a
public normative culture and history-within and to, if you like, a
normative practice. The pragmatic argumentative style is not, how-
ever, a style of rationalistic or traditionalistic closure. Pragmatic ar-
gument does not proceed tightly or deductively from either a
strongly deterministic view of human nature or a strongly static or
authoritarian view of tradition. If pragmatic political argument does
locate itself within a public normative history, it also adopts a critical
and always potentially transformative attitude toward that history.
It regards that history as always containing resources that can be
applied to its own critical re-examination and, therefore, as always
being ripe for the transformative exercise of what has been called
interpretation,' 3 or internal development,' 4 or recollective ima-
gination. i5
Dialogic conceptions of politics belong to the same broad fam-
ily of discourse conceptions as do some familiar and influential con-
temporary conceptions of legal or judicial argument, such as Ronald
Dworkin's conception of law as both "integrity" (representing the
community's commitment to "consistency in principle" in its treat-
ment of its members)16 and "interpretation" (representing the com-
munity's commitment to critical self-revision).17 Not by accident, of
course, do I present pragmatic normative dialogue as a conception
of politics, whereas others present something very like it as a con-
ception of law or adjudication.' 8 For I believe that, but for one
wrong and indefensible turn in his own inquiry into the question of
"how law is possible,"' 9 we should have found among those others
the same Owen Fiss who in his Stevens Lecture so strenuously ob-
jected to confusing law with politics.
For Fiss, the Constitution, regarded as law, is "an embodiment
of a public morality." 20 It is not an outcome of a strategic interplay
of preferences. It is, rather, an "authoritative" expression of "pub-
12 See D. HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL THEORY
(1985); R. RoRTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
13 M. WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987).
14 R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 18-19 (1986).
15 See Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potentialfor
Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1988).
16 See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 164-75, 211-15 (1986).
17 See id. at 189, Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 527 (1982).
18 See Michelman, supra note 8, at 1513-15, 1528-29.
19 Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 3, at 189.
20 Fiss, supra note 2, at 14. The following account of Fiss's views is drawn from id.;
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lic values and ideals."' 2' Since, as Fiss argues, all expressions, how-
ever authoritative, are open to interpretation-indeed they are inert
pending interpretation-the constitutional adjudicator's role cannot
be one of passive or mechanical transmission of values authorially
written into the Constitution. It must, rather, be one of active eluci-
dation of the meaning of constitutional values. The constitutional
adjudicator must somehow both observe and respect constitutional
values as authoritative and, at the same time, participate in their
making. "[I]nterpretation is a process of generating meaning;" 22 it
is "a dynamic interaction between text and reader" that allows the
judge "a creative role." 23
Creative indeed! The creation in which the active constitu-
tional adjudicator participates is, Fiss says, the creation of nothing
less than us-us as a normative community, us as a group consti-
tuted by a narrative practice. This is true, Fiss believes, because the
values embodied in the Constitution's clauses on equality and lib-
erty are the ones that "give our society an identity and inner coher-
ence-its distinctive public morality;" 24 thus they are, in the deepest
possible political sense of the word, public values. And yet they are
also values whose meaning always awaits judicial elucidation. Fiss is
explicit about this community recreating, this interminably Prome-
thean role of the constitutional adjudicator: "[L]aw appears as gen-
erative of public values as it is dependent upon them. The Warren
Court and the transformative process that it precipitated in Ameri-
can society not only presupposed a belief in the existence of public
values but was also responsible for it."25
We see that actively creative constitutional adjudication is, for
Fiss, required by the nature of human language and communica-
tion.2 6 But that is not all that Fiss has to say in defense of a morally
generative role for constitutional adjudicators. He also, although
less explicitly, finds such a role to be required by a certain theory of
political freedom to which he evidently subscribes.
Constitutionalism is that theory. 27 Constitutionalism as norma-
tive political theory is characterized by its dual commitments to a
Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 3; Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 3; Fiss, Foreword, supra note
3.
21 Fiss, supra note 2, at 8, 14. See Fiss, Foreword, supra note 3, at 1-2.
22 Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 3, at 743.
23 Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 3, at 180-81.
24 Fiss, Foreword, supra note 3, at 11.
25 Fiss, supra note 2, at 15.
26 Cf Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Lau, 69 B.U.L. REV. (forthcoming 1989) (argu-
ing from Wittgenstein's analysis of rules as social practices that every purported act of
rule-application is also, necessarily, an act of rule-creation).
27 What follows is my own interpretation of Fiss's thought. He has not explicitly
analyzed the notion of constitutionalism in the terms I propose.
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government of laws and to self-government.2 8 The first of these
commitments demands that the effective institutionalized orderings
of social life proceed (using Fiss's terminology) from values and not
mere preferences. The second would seem to demand that the val-
ues informing those ordering be, in some appropriate sense, our val-
ues-ours collectively, all of ours. So far as I can discover, Fiss has
never quite explicitly affirmed a connection between a constitution-
alist commitment to popular self-government and his notion of law
as an expression of "our public values," although he has come
close.29 That notion does, all the same, require that there must be
some point, some moment in constitutional practice, at and from
which values that are (in some sense) public arise and enter into the
practice.
Fiss evidently takes the view that public values cannot enter the
system from any point that is a theater of politics and hence, by his
understanding, not of law.30 This must be true, in Fiss's view, be-
cause politics just is activity directed toward the registration of pref-
erence and not the determination of value.
The instrumentalist description of politics evidently holds, for
Fiss, even as to the politics of constitution-making-the political ac-
tivity of constitutional framers and ratifiers. 31 We can see this in his
response to the familiar charge of "counter majoritarian!" against
the creative style of constitutional adjudication he favors. The gist
of that response is that "the counter majoritarian dilemma" is not
peculiarly a bane of creative constitutional interpretation, but rather
is "pervasive and attends no less upon the interpretive pursuit of
meanings intended by the framers."'3 2
Fiss says that while the judicial role is "trivialized" under such a
self-effacing conception of it, power is not thereby reserved from
the judiciary for "the contemporary majority," but rather "is . . .
given to the framers."33 A question not addressed is why this very
sort of shift of authority from an unelected judiciary to constitu-
tional framers and ratifiers ought not to count as profoundly sup-
portive of self-government.3 4
An answer consistent with Fiss's generally jaundiced view of
28 See Michelman, supra note 8, at 1499-1503.
29 See Fiss, Foreword, supra note 3, at 1: "[Constitutional] values determine the qual-
ity of our social existence-they truly belong to the public-and as a consequence, the
range of voices that give meaning to these values is as broad as the public itself."
30 See Fiss, supra note 2, at 9 (equating the view that law is "politics in another
guise" with denial of "the distinctive claim of law as a form of rationality").
31 But see Michelman, Conceptions, supra note 9; Michelman, supra note 8, at 1510-13.
32 Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 3, at 181-82.
33 Id. at 182.
34 For an argument as to how it might so count, see Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:
Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013-31 (1984).
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politics would be that the popular politics of constitution-making is
still politics-presumptively no less a manifestation of will and no
more one of reason than the ordinary politics of "the contemporary
majority." On that understanding, we would face an inescapable
choice between creative judicial constitutional interpretation and
subjection to someone's despotic politics of preference. Forjudges to
decline judicial review entirely would simply transfer power from
the judge to a political (i.e., preferential) majority of our contempo-
raries. By the same token, Fiss apparently thinks, for judges to try
to construe constitutional clauses "mechanically," according to their
original meaning as they came from the framers, would (insofar as
the effort could succeed) simply cast us into subjection to the prefer-
ential politics of a past generation. 35
It would follow that nothing could possibly stand between us
and the despotism of "men"-nothing could possibly shield us
against subjection to each other's preferences-save actively crea-
tive interpretation by judicial constitutional adjudicators, which is
what Fiss calls "law," because all the rest of the system is politics
and politics is just the registration of preference. And so, Fiss con-
cludes, it must fall to judges as constitutional adjudicators to be the
organs-even the generators-of the public values upon whose ef-
fective presence the whole point of constitutionalism depends. Ad-
judication, then, cannot itself be either a form of self-indulgent,
preferential politics or a form of slavish rule-following. Adjudica-
tion must be rational and objective but also critical and creative.
That sounds like a hard prescription to fill. To explain how it can be
met is to explain, in Fiss's phrase, "how law is possible." 36
Many have sought the answer to that question in some form of
natural law theory. Others have begun-or, doubtless better, begun
again-to seek it in the idea of normative pragmatic political dia-
logue.3 7 Fiss takes neither of those paths. He seeks the answer,
rather, in what he calls conventionalism and in what I (for my own
no doubt tendentious purposes) have chosen to call professional-
ism. As Fiss put the matter in his Stevens Lecture:
35 The point would hold regardless of whether the claim for relief against the action
of a contemporary majority was granted or denied. At issue in every constitutional case
is a claim for protection or relief against the action or inaction of an effective. contempo-
rary legislative majority. The aim of originalistic constitutional adjudication is to hand
over to the framers the power to determine what particular schedule of protections and
reliefs our constitutional regime shall contain. The framers would be determining refus-
als as well as grantings of relief.
36 Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 3, at 189.
37 See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 15; Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution. 72
MINN. L. R.v. 1331 (1988); Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34
UCLA L. REv. 1615 (1987); Michelman, supra note 8. Radin, supra note 26.
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[J]udges are insulated from the political process and are required
to engage in a special kind of dialogue over the meaning of [our
public] values. This dialogue is arduous and taxing, at times al-
most beyond the powers of anyone,38 but it is an essential part of
the process through which a morality evolves and retains its public
character....
•.. [W]hat the law or objectivity requires or even aspires to
. . . is [not deductive determinacy but just] that judges be con-
strained in their judgment, and that they certainly are....
*.. [Judges are] public officials situated within a professiop,
bounded at every turn by the norms and conventions that define
and constitute that profession .... Guided by years of training
and experience, they read earlier cases, and sense which way the
law is moving. They consider the role of the state ... in the life of
the nation .... They also know what constitutes a good reason
for distinguishing [one case from another] or for deciding the case
one way or another. In sum, the [judges] are disciplined in the
exercise of their power. They are caught in a network of so-called
'disciplining rules' which, like a grammar, define and constitute
the practice of judging and are rendered authoritative by the in-
terpretive community of which the [judges] are part.39
Let us now consider two somewhat contrasting senses in which
the word "public" may be used in a phrase like "public values." A
value is public in what we may call the epistemological sense if it has
the character of objectivity, or intersubjectivity; that is, it is public if
it has the quality of being demonstrable to persons other than its
initial proponent in a way that leads to its recognition and accept-
ance by those persons-persons who, we can therefore conclude,
are co-participants with the proponent in some discursive or argu-
mentative practice constituted by discourse norms that they all ac-
cept. A value is public in what we may call the political sense if it is
justifiably ascribed to a political community, as that community's
value. Straightforwardly, such an ascription is justified when the
community has adopted the value by some collective process that we
can recognize as appropriate to the adoption of values on the com-
munity's collective behalf.40
It seems obvious that a value can be public in the epistemologi-
cal sense without being public in the political sense. This can come
about in two ways. First, the community of participants or practi-
tioners for whom the value is epistemologically public-the group
38 The judge is not only Prometheus but Hercules, too. See R. DWORKIN, Hard Cases,
in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977).
39 Fiss, supra note 2, at 8, 11.
40 We may take it that a clear case would be a law duly enacted in accordance with a
recognizably democratic, constitutionally prescribed procedure carried out in what I
have called a dialogic spirit.
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of persons commonly engaged in the discursive practice that vali-
dates the value-may not be coextensive with any political commu-
nity. Second, the discursive practice itself, which defines its
community of practitioners, may not be appropriate to the legisla-
tion (so to call it) of values on behalf of a political community. For
example, the community of practitioners may be a community of
scientists whose discursive practice centers around controlled labo-
ratory experimentation. For another example-this one not so far
afield from our topic-the community of practitioners may be the
professional community of lawyers, whose discursive practice is
what has been called, inter alia, elegantiajuris.
In which sense of "public" might it be true that good-faith en-
gagement in the discourse practice of a special professional culture
would tend to ensure the publicness of the values issuing from that
engagement? Are we talking here of the political sense of public or
the epistemological sense of public?
As far as I can see, Fiss's argument equivocates, crucially and
fatally, on the meaning of "public," just where it resorts to judicial
professionalism to supply the requisite moment of objectivity to a
value-generative process of constitutional adjudication. Fiss does
not adequately explain how or why the doctrine emanating from
professional legal convention will express values that are politically
public. He does not adequately engage with the question of why
values that are epistemologically public to the profession of law, or
to its judicial branch, might safely be presumed consistent with the
constitutionalist commitment to a government of the people by the
people. His commendatory accounts of conventionalism tender no
justification for his repeated naming of what issues from the assidu-
ously cultivated professional practice of lawyer-judges as "our public
values"-unless, of course, he is talking only to lawyers.
In fairness, we have to recognize that Fiss is driven to profes-
sional culture in search of an answer to a hard question: How is law
possible? On his behalf, one might fairly ask where, if not in the
professional culture and discipline of judges, we can hope to find
the capacity for authoritative discernment and articulation of polit-
ical-moral values (not preferences) that might be public, even in the
weak sense of not being factionally or sectionally partisan, let alone
the strong sense of their being, as Fiss perhaps too carelessly likes to
say, "ours." If "nowhere" is the answer, then it is too much to ask
that the regnant values should also be literally "ours" -that is,
should be public in what I've called the political sense. The better
can be the enemy of the good, and perhaps being ruled by values
ascribed to us by the disciplined discourse of a legal-judicial profes-
sional community is the best we can prudently hope for.
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There is a word for those who obstinately will not take "no-
where" for a conversation-stopping answer, even when it might be
true. That word is "utopian." Here is a sample of its use in Profes-
sor Fiss's Stevens Lecture:
[O]nce Professor Michelman... insisted that while there could
never be a right answer in the law, there could be (indeed must
be) right answers in morals. This view ... seems to be at odds
with common intuitions. Given the institutional apparatus of the
law, and the shared understandings that bond and animate the
profession, I think it far more likely for there to be right answers
in the law than in morals. Of course, [the notion of there being a
right answer, or of there being the force of the better argument,
in] morality does not require 'the compulsion of a transcendent
rule,' to use a phrase of Michelman's, but neither does [the com-
parable notion with respect to] law. It requires only constrained
judgment. An insistence upon the contrary, and an attempt to de-
pict [the notion of an autonomous, objective, and trans-political]
law in other terms, as 'transcendent' ... or 'unitary,' strikes me as
a desperate but transparent attempt to ... render credible ajuris-
prudence that rests ... on a special strain of utopianism, one that
rightly aspires to a true and substantive equality, but fails to ac-
cord a proper place for the institutional arrangements needed to
bring that ideal into being.41
In order to see clearly what is here at issue between Fiss and
myself, we need a more extended account both of my view that Fiss
means to criticize and of his criticism. Here, then, cast as an imagi-
nary speech by Fiss, is my understanding of his understanding of
what our dispute is about. "The topic," I hear Fiss saying in my
mind's ear,
"is constitutional adjudication. Michelman's thought about that is
motivated by the idea of judicial action that contributes toward
achievement of a certain substantial goal of equality. So he, like
me, must understand constitutional adjudication as a process of
advancing the realization of values attributed to the Constitution.
Michelman isn't one of the nihilists who deny that there are any
values to be attributed. His problem isn't nihilism, exactly; it's
utopianism. Allow me to explain.
"However commendable his affirmative social-visionary aspi-
ration for law, Michelman unfortunately joins forces with those
who do destructively say that 'law is politics,' meaning thereby to
deny that adjudication properly involves special forms of knowl-
edge, reason, or argument that set it categorically and autono-
41 Fiss, supra note 2, at 13. I have inserted the bracketed material to clarify Fiss's
meaning to readers coming fresh to the conversation. Fiss actually wrote "'transcen-
dent,' 'mechanical,' or 'unitary' " where I quote him as having said " 'transcendent'...
or 'unitary' ". I do not recall ever having used "mechanical" in this context.
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mously apart from political argument at large. I understand that
among Michelman's motives for attacking this dualistic view of
law's relation to politics is that he thinks it unnecessarily prompts
judges to impede movement by others towards social justice or
inhibits them from making their own movements in that direc-
tion.4 2 He thinks that a more openly and affirmatively politicized
judicial style would best allow the judiciary to serve the end of
social justice.
"It is precisely in this respect that I criticize Michelman's view
as utopian. By utopian I mean that Michelman's view is not only
unrealistically optimistic, but destructively so. The destructive-
ness lies in the aid and comfort that Michelman, like it or not,
gives to legal nihilism. By denying not just the reality but even the
ideal of the autonomous, trans-political character of adjudication,
Michelman overlooks the need to imbue judicial acts, including
those that would advance the cause of social justice, with the char-
acter (this doesn't mean just the semblance or the trappings but
the authentic character) of objectivity required in order that those
acts might command or, indeed, merit public respect.
"Denial of law's aspiration to trans-political autonomy might
be justified, even so, if Michelman were correct in asserting that
for judges engaged in adjudication the only alternative to engage-
ment in ordinary-politics-as-usual is mechanical or passive sub-
mission to what he calls 'the compulsion of a transcendent rule.'
43
But he isn't. Michelman's error likes in equating adjudication's
reach for trans-political objectivity with judicial automaticity. The
error lies in leaving no conceptual space between unmodulated
judicial preferential politics on the one hand and passive judicial
submission to pre-existing, extra-judicial authority on the other
hand. Michelman thus suppresses the possibility of an adjudica-
tive practice that is both creatively active and trans-politically ob-
jective, deriving its objectivity not from deference to extra-judicial
authority, but from the argumentative constraints of professional
culture and institutional arrangements. Once this possibility of
constraint by professionalism is recognized and admitted, there
remains no need to court the delegitimation of adjudication by
denying, as I once heard Michelman deny, that there are right an-
swers in law, in order to hold open an active and creative role for
constitutional adjudicators in the country's striving towards social
justice."
What is my response to what we've just heard? In sum, I do
find a form of normative argument occupying the space between
42 As evidence, Fiss might want to cite, nunc pro tunc, Michelman, supra note 8, at
1494-95, 1513-15; Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property,
72 IowA L. REv. 1319, 1340-50 (1987).
43 For Fiss's possible reasons for such a concession, see supra text accompanying
notes 24-36.
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deference to authority and unmodulated preference. Only I class
that form of argument as political rather than as anti-political. I re-
gard it as continuous rather than as discontinuous with the law-de-
termining process of self-governing people. It remains to be seen
whether matters of consequence turn upon this difference in classifi-
catory rhetorics.
I agree with Fiss that the constitutionalist ideal of a government
of laws involves moments of participant objectivity or partial self-
transcendence. But for reasons that must be obvious, it seems to
me a serious misstep to locate this objectivity in a select group and
its special professional inculcation into craft values. Such a turn to
professionalism strikes me as despairingly anti-political, in the sense
of anti-democratic. I would still rather seek (I don't say assuredly to
find) the requisite moments of objectivity, compatibly with constitu-
tionalism's other primal commitment to a government of the people
by the people, within politics and not in flight from politics. 44
In order to understand how law is possible on constitutionalist
premises-government of the people by the people/government of
laws-one has to understand how politics can conceivably be a thea-
ter of law. That much seems implicit in the premises themselves. 45
It would follow that constitutional adjudicators can contribute to
constitutional legality, if at all, only by understanding themselves as
in some way participant in, without preempting, the politics of the
people at large imagined as, at least on occasion, dialogic in charac-
ter.46 Yet in order to be consonant with the most salient features of
the social practice we know as American constitutionalism, judicial
participation in politics would have to take some form respectful of
that practice's designed institutional differentiation between courts
and legislatures. It would be hard to credit a professed judicial in-
terpretation of American constitutional law that was not firmly pre-
mised on the idea of a secondary, not primary, political role for the
courts. Constitutional adjudication must justifiably present itself as
judicial "review."
I have argued elsewhere47 that some restoration ofjudicial con-
44 Obviously, I speak here not of the instrumentalist politics of preference, which is
the only kind of politics that Fiss seems able to contemplate seriously, but of dialogic
politics-politics as it ought to be, and can be, and sometimes is, and frequently is not;
just as Fiss (whether or not utopianly) allows himself to speak of adjudication as it ought
to be but-I suppose this will be admitted-not necessarily always is. Just as Fiss charac-
terizes adjudication as he believes it must be capable of being if law is to be possible,
with just that justification do I speak of a dialogic politics, of which adjudication is one
institutionally specialized form, implied by the idea of a government of laws that is also a
government of the people by the people.
45 See Michelman, supra note 8, at 1499-1503.
46 See id. at 1524-26.
47 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 42.
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fidence in the possibility of good-faith, normative, pragmatic dia-
logue-whether you want to call it law or politics-would be good
for our practice ofjudicial review. For present purposes, it does not
much matter whether you, reader, agree with my argument. The
more pertinent question is what Professor Fiss has to say about it-a
question, as we shall see, about which we are not left completely to
the vagaries of speculation.
Consider the argument as I have made it with specific reference
to the Supreme Court's invocation, in Buckley v. Valeo,48 of the first
amendment against congressional regulation of political campaign
contributions.49 The argument proceeds from the observation that
the challenged legislation might fairly be understood, at least prima
facie, as a good-faith legislative effort to resolve a practical conflict of
constitutional values in a way that maximizes the system of equal
liberties of political expression. 50 This is not to deny that alterna-
tive explanations are possible or that the occasion might be one jus-
tifying the attitude toward democratic political machination that
John Ely commends as "distrust." 5' The argument is that within the
total context of American constitutionalism it is inappropriate to
parlay distrust into automatic invalidation of laws restricting some
people's political speech, refusing inquiry into the effects of those
laws upon the system of political speech as a whole, including its
distributive dimension. Automatic invalidation and refusal of in-
quiry is flight from judicial responsibility. The flight response, the
argument adds, is abetted by false belief in the need to choose be-
tween the self-indulgent or partisan politics of preference on the
one hand and the disciplined objectivity of following a plain and
simple, pre-ordained and externally dictated rule on the other hand.
A credible notion of pragmatic normative dialogue could thus
serve as a point of mediation and rapprochement between politics and
law. Recovery of confidence in the possibility of good-faith argu-
ment constrained by pragmatic reason-giving could fortify a court's
willingness to believe that legislatures restricting constitutionally
valued liberties sometimes do so in genuine and reasonable pursuit
of constitutional values carrying greater weight in the circum-
48 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
49 See Michelman, supra note 42, at 1345-50. More recently (if less confidently) I
have proposed a somewhat similar argument against excessively doctrinaire (although
arguably not finally indefensible) judicial invocation of the first amendment against laws
seeking to regulate pornography as a form of sex discrimination. See generally
Michelman, Conceptions, supra note 9.
50 The literature supporting this approach to defense of the expenditure-limita-
tions in Buckley is considerable. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTrIONAL LAW 809-
11 (1978).
51 SeeJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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stances.52 Of no less importance, such a recovery of confidence in
normative practical reason could fortify, too, that same court's will-
ingness to exercise (and its supporting sense of the country's will-
ingness to accept) its collective judgment as to whether legislation
under review merits judicial respect despite its restrictive impact on
constitutionally valued liberties according to an appropriate "bal-
ancing test." Such a test might ask whether those who suffer restric-
tion of their liberties by the challenged legislation can fairly be
expected to accept that restriction as consonant with a good-faith
exercise in dialogic politics in which all the contesting constitutional
claims and values were fairly and sensitively considered.
Is the question thus posed suitable to a proper judicial role in a
democratic constitutional system-secondary, but still responsible
and not abdicative? The answer partly depends on whether ques-
tions cast in such a form are amenable to the persuasive constraint
of pragmatic political argument. Grant for the moment that they
are.53 Notice, then, that argument over such a question will engage
a court's members in efforts, although at one remove, to interpret
and elucidate the same conflicts, in the same contexts, among the
same values (including the question of their relative weights in the
circumstances) that presumably or hypothetically provided the grist
for an enacting legislature's own dialogic-political mill. To that ex-
tent, the judicial question would be just what Fiss says we cannot
name it without destroying the law's claim to respect as "a form of
rationality," namely, "politics in another guise." 54
The odd thing is that Fiss seems to agree in all relevant aspects
with my diagnosis and prescription for cases like Buckley. "The
state," he has written, "... can act either as a friend or enemy of
speech... -55 Constitutional adjudicators will serve us best by un-
dertaking ".. . to recognize when [the state] is acting in one capacity
rather than another," 56 although the requisite judgments of practi-
cal reason will be debatable even to the point of "excruciation." 57
And consider upon what intellectual force Fiss lays the blame for
currently blocking the judiciary from this, its proper work. He
blames what he calls a capital-T "Tradition" of first amendmentju-
risprudence-a "tradition" in which the state is too automatically
cast as the enemy of autonomy rather than the friend of democratic
public debate and in which free speech is too automatically accorded
52 See Michelman, Conceptions, supra note 9.
53 For discussion, see generally Michelman, Whither the Rule of Law?, 69 B.U.L. REV.
(forthcoming 1989).
54 Fiss, supra note 2, at 9.
55 Fiss, Why the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787 (1987).
56 Id.
57 Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405, 1420-21 (1986).
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a "peculiar status" of constitutional sanctity, as an ideological token
of limited government.58 "Grit" scholars, using a different vocabu-
lary from Fiss's, might have chosen the term "reification" for the
sort of obstructive intellectual force of which he complains. Or how
about "bad conventionalism?"
Doubtless conventionalisms, like politics, can be both good and
bad. Fiss may have in mind a "good," pragmatic judicial conven-
tional practice rather than a "bad," reified one, a practice composed
of just those "craft values" and "disciplining rules" that would
prompt its judicial votaries to just the sort of good judicial politics
that he and I both seem to be commending. Such a reading would
at any rate help to square Fiss's commendations ofjudicial conven-
tionalism with his commendations of a judicial style that I would call
political. If that reading is rejected, then I cannot understand how
the government of the people by the people can coexist with judicial
conventionalism. If it is accepted, what becomes unclear is the basis
for Fiss's claim to have found in judicial conventionalism a source of
normative objectivity so special, so distinct from politics in general,
as to warrant his distancing himself, by denunciation, from scholars
who have been intent upon noticing adjudication's continuity with
politics.
So I speak for bringing law back to politics and politics back to
law. You will understand why I think of this as bringing law back to
life. When it comes to disenchantment you may well, as I have said,
think I have just exchanged one- spell for another. I guess that
would make you a nihilist, from my perspective. But that's not a
very interesting remark.
58 Fiss, Foreword, supra note 3, at 782-83, 785-86.
1989] 269
